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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MUNICIPAL 
BILLBOARD ORDINANCES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
FREE SPEECH-Metromedia, Inc. v. City ofSan Diego, 453 U.S. 490 
(1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first amendment of the United States Constitution states in 
part that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of 
speech...."1 City ordinances declare that municipalities have the 
power to zone through the police power of the state.2 When zoning 
ordinances attempt to limit billboard advertising, however, these two 
rights conflict, and the power to zone will sometimes infringe upon a 
person's freedom of speech. This note examines the conflict between 
municipal zoning ordinances that regulate billboards and the first 
amendment right to free speech, using Metromedia, Inc. v. City of 
San Diego 3 as the leading example ofjudicial response to the issues 
encompassed by the conflict. 
Metromedia is important oecause it was the first occasion that 
the Supreme Court squarely addressed the constitutionality of bill­
board regulation by local governments. In the past, the Court has 
summarily upheld4 billboard prohibitions against first amendment 
challenges. More recently, however, as exemplified by Metromedia, 
the Court has held that summarily dismissed cases do not have the 
same degree of authority as do decisions given plenary considera­
tion.s The Court's decision in Metromedia, therefore, did not rest 
upon past holdings, but rather upon an independent examination of 
the facts presented.6 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
442 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK]. 
3. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
4. Lotze v. Washington, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 
U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978). 
5. 453 U.S. at 498. 
6. Id 
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In Metromedia, the Supreme Court considered the validity of 
the billboard ordinance of the city of San Diego.7 The Court consid­
ered separately the effect of the ordinance on commercial and non­
commercial speech and used different criteria to deal with the 
validity of each restriction.s The Court held that insofar as it regu­
lated commercial speech, the ordinance directly served the goals of 
the state and was within constitutionallimits.9 Despite this finding, 
the entire ordinance was invalidated because it unreasonably in­
fringed upon an individual's right to free speech by interfering with 
the use of noncommercial billboards. \0 
On the issue of noncommercial speech, the Court concluded 
that San Diego's general ban on billboards carrying noncommercial 
advertising was invalid under the first and fourteenth amendments ll 
7. The general prohibition in San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10795 (New Series), en­
acted March 14, 1972, reads as follows: 
B. OFF-PREMISE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING DISPLAY SIGNS PRO­
HIBITED 
Only those outdoor advertising display signs, hereinafter referred to as 
signs in this Division, which are either signs designating the name of the owner 
or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying 
such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services 
rendered on the premises upon which such signs are placed shall be permitted. 
The following signs shall be prohibited: 
1. Any sign identifying a use, facility or service which is not located on 
the premises. 
2. Any sign identifying a product which is not produced, sold or manu­
factured on the premises. 
3. Any sign which advertises or otherwise directs attention to a product, 
service or activity, event, person, institution or business which mayor may not 
be identified by a brand name and which occurs or is generally conducted, sold, 
manufactured, produced or offered elsewhere than on the premises where such 
sign is located. 
453 U.S. at 493. 
8. Id. at 504-05 n.l (quoting San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10795 (New Series) 
(March 14, 1972». In dealing with commercial speech and the use of billboards, the 
Court applied a balancing test to determine if the ordinance was directly related to a 
permissible state objective. Absent a direct relationship, the ordinance must fall. See J. 
NOWAK, supra note 2, at 675-76. In dealing with noncommercial speech, a strict scrutiny 
test was applied where the Court required more than a direct relationship between a 
zoning measure and its objective. As freedom of speech is a fundamental right, an ordi­
nance will be struck down unless the state meets the burden of showing that it has a 
compelling interest in the objective in question. Id A greater degree of protection is 
accorded noncommercial speech as it includes political, social and personal ideas. On 
the other hand, commercial speech includes (for purposes of this discussion) "speech of 
any form that advertises a product or service for profit or for business purposes.'~ Id at 
767. 
9. 453 U.S. at 503-12. 
10. Id at 512-20. 
11. Id at 521. 
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because it prohibited individuals from displaying, on rented bill­
board space, their own political viewpoints and social beliefs. 12 Sec­
ondly, the Court determined that a prohibition of all billboard 
messages could not be upheld merely because the prohibition was 
rationally related to a nonspeech interest. 13 The Court reasoned in­
stead that noncommercial speech is a fundamental right under the 
first amendment and cannot be infringed upon unless a compelling 
state interest is demonstrated. 14 In Metromedia, San Diego demon­
strated no compelling interest, and consequently, the ordinance was 
held invalid on its face as an unconstitutional restriction of noncom­
mercial speech. 15 
In considering the city's ban on commercial, off-site advertising, 
the Court stated that while the first and fourteenth amendments pro­
tect the communicative aspects of billboards, the government retains 
the authority to care for the safety of its citizens and the beauty of its 
city.16 The state's power extends to improvement of the safety and 
aesthetics of its cities. These governmental goals were served di­
rectly by the commercial speech restriction in the San Diego ordi­
nance which did not allow for off-site commercial advertising,l7 
In dealing with the distinction between off-site and on-site com­
. mercial advertising, the Court gave deference to the San Diego city 
council and concluded that San Diego could decide to value com­
mercial speech through on-site advertising, more than commercial 
speech through off-site advertising, and that the San Diego city 
council had acted within the scope of its power. 18 
This note will analyze the rationale used by the Court to permit 
municipalities to ban certain types of commercial speech as a func­
tion of the police power interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. The 
issue of first amendment protections afforded noncommercial speech 
will also be discussed. 
12. Id. at 520. 
13. See note 8 supra. 




16. See id. at 511-12. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. The ordinance reflects a decision by the city of San Diego that the right to 
use on-site advertising is stronger than the city's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics. 
Id. The Court, however, rejected the appellants' contention that the city could not ban 
all off-site commercial advertising because a commercial enterprise has a strong interest 
in identifying its place of business and in advertising the goods and services available. 
Other commercial enterprises that had previously used off-site advertising could just as 
easily use other advertising means such as television, radio and magazines, which would 
not impair traffic safety nor contribute to the ugliness of the city. 
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II. FACTS OF METROMEDIA 

The City of San Diego, California, enacted an ordinance that 
imposed prohibitions on the erection of outdoor advertising display 
signs. 19 The ordinance provided two exceptions to these general 
prohibitions: on-site commercial signs and signs falling within 
twelve categories.20 On-site signs are defined as those naming the 
business and occupant of the premises upon which signs' are struc­
tured, or those advertising goods or services rendered on the prem­
ises upon which the signs are placed.21 The ordinance, therefore, 
allowed on-site commercial advertising, while it prohibited off-site 
commercial advertising and all noncommercial advertising. The 
stated purpose of this ordinance was to maintain the city's appear­
ance and to eliminate the dangers to pedestrians and motorists 
brought about by the large and distracting displays.22 Appellants, 
companies engaged in the outdoor advertising business,23 brought 
suit in state court to enjoin enforcement of the ban on outdoor ad­
vertising displays within the city. 
The trial court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional 
exercise of the city's police power and that it abridged appellants' 
first amendment rights.24 The California Court of Appeals af­
firmed25 on the question of the police power and did not reach the 
first amendment argument. The California Supreme Court in Me
19. The Supreme Court of California defined the term "outdoor advertising dis­
play sign" as "a rigidly assembled sign, display, or device permanently affixed to the 
ground or permanently attached to a building or other inherently permanent structure 
cons~ituting, or used for the display of, a commercial or other advertisement to the pub­
lic." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 856 n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 
513 n.2, 610 P.2d 407, 410 n.2 (1980) (citing Revenue and Taxation Code section 
18090.2), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
20. 453 U.S. at 495 n.3. The signs falling within any of the following twelve speci­
fied categories were not barred by the ordinance: government signs; signs located at 
public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported or stored within the city, if not used for 
advertising purposes; commemorative historical plaques; religious symbols; signs within 
shopping malls; "for sale" and "for lease" signs; signs on public and commercial vehicles; 
signs depicting time, temperature, and news; approved temporary, off-premises, subdivi­
sion directional signs; and "temporary political signs." San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 
10795 (New Series) (March 14, 1972). 
21. 453 U.S. at 494. 
22. Id at 493. 
23. Id. at 496. Each cOmpany owned anywhere from 500 to 800 outdoor advertis­
ing displays within the city. These signs were located in areas zoned for commercial and 
industrial purposes, most of them on property leased by the appellants for the purpose of 
maintaining billboards. Space on the signs was made available to interested advertisers, 
and the advertisement on each sign was usually changed every month. Id. at 496. 
24. Id at 497. 
25. Id 
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tromedia, Inc. v. City ofSan Diego,26 reversed holding that the two 
purposes of the ordinance were within the city's legitimate interests 
because the ordinance zoned billboards in a manner beneficial to the 
public safety and welfareP The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.28 Appellants argued that the ordinance was inva­
lid on its face under the first amendment.29 The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of California,30 and 
held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it 
prohibited all noncommercial advertising.31 
III. BILLBOARD REGULATION 
Billboards are a unique medium ofcommunication used to con­
vey messages ranging in scope from political and social comments to 
commercial advertising. While billboards serve to furnish people 
with information, they can simultaneously be viewed as an obstacle 
to traffic safety and to the beauty of a city. 
Billboards present a unique problem because they encompass 
both communicative and noncommunicative aspects.32 The commu­
nicative aspect is the message conveyed on the billboard whether it 
be an advertisement, traffic regulation, or political idea. The 
noncommunicative aspect encompasses the billboard structure itself. 
These large, immobile structures are not afforded any first amend­
ment protections. Their communicative aspect, however, is pro­
tected by the first amendment. Thus, although the speech is 
protected by the first amendment,33 the billboard itself, upon which 
the message is conveyed, is subject to regulation by the state's police 
power. 
26. 26 Cal. 3d 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510,610 P.2d 407 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 
(1981). 
27. Id. at 855, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 512, 610 P.2d at 409. 
28. 453 U.S. at 498. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 490. Metromedia was a plurality decision. Justice White's holding and 
rationale were joined by only three other Justices. See notes 145-56 infra and accompa­
nying text. 
31. Id. Noncommercial speech is a fundamental right which is fully protected by 
the first amendment. See J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 675. 
32. 453 U.S. at 501-02. 
33. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 581 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. 
TRIBE]. 
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A. Police Power Regulation of the Noncommunicafive 
Aspects ofBillboards 
The exercise of a city's police power34 is constitutionaP5 when it 
bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or 
general welfare of its citizens.36 Legislative motives or declarations 
of intent do not determine the ultimate validity of a police power 
ordinance.37 Rather, the regulation must bear a rational relation to a 
permissible police power purpose while providing for an impartially 
administer~d, reasonable means to accomplish its police objectives.38 
Under the police power of a state, a municipality has a legiti­
mate interest in controlling the noncommunicative aspects of bill­
boards.39 Yet the individual's interest in the communicative aspects 
of billboards must be protected under the first and fourteenth 
amendments.40 When restrictions on the noncommunicative aspects 
infringe upon the communicative aspects, it is necessary to reconcile 
the state interest in the public welfare with the individual's right to 
free speech.41 In other words, the billboard structure cannot be regu­
lated at the expense of freedom of speech. 
B. 	 Regulating the Communicative Aspects 
of Commercial Billboards 
Commercial speech has been granted some first amendment 
protection in recent years,42 although there remains a distinction be­
tween speech proposing a commercial transaction and ideological 
34. 	 See notes 35-40 infra and accompanying text. 
35. The Court held that in order to be unconstitutional an ordinance must be 
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare." Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 
395 (1926) (citations omitted). 
36. Id While the concept of "general welfare" is elastic and responds to the chang­
ing needs of society, a number of courts have held that the general welfare does not 
include aesthetic considerations unaccompanied by other public welfare considerations. 
See, e.g., City of Euclid v. Fitzhum, 48 Ohio App. 2d 297, 357 N.E.2d 402 (1976) (ordi­
nance that proscribed parking or storage of trailers outside of garage held unconstitu­
tional as aesthetic zoning). 
37. 	 Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Ky. 1964). 
38. 	 Id at 887. 
39. 	 See Kovac v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
40. 	 See J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 676. 
41. The task of reconciliation falls upon the courts. "'[AJ court may not escape the 
task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public 
interest allegedly served by the regulation.''' 453 U.S. at 502 (quoting Bigelow v. Vir­
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975». 
42. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1978); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
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speech. In Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Association,43 the Supreme Court 
stated: "[W]e instead have afforded commercial speech a limited 
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position 
in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommer­
cial expression."44 
In regulating the use of billboards, the government directs its 
efforts at the noncommunicative impact of the structure, and must 
balance the competing interests involved.45 Regulatory choices 
aimed at harms notcaused by ideas or information are acceptable as 
long as the regulations do not unnecessarily interfere with the flow of 
communication.46 A regulation, therefore, will be balanced between 
the value of freedom of expression and the state's interest in 
regulation. 
In'Metromedia, the Supreme Court recognized that the commu­
nicative aspect of commercial advertising is to be afforded a limited 
measure of protection.47 In affirming that commercial speech is to be 
given a lesser degree of constitutional protection than noncommer­
cial speech, the Court, in effect, used a balancing approach to decide 
whether the billboard ordinance of San Diego unreasonably con­
flicted with commercial advertising.48 In doing so, the Court bal­
anced the state's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics against the 
communicative value of banned commercial messages.49 
Local governments traditionally could not regulate private 
property under the police power solely for aesthetic purposes. 50 The 
Supreme Court of California in Metromedia 51 overruled the seventy­
one year old California case, Varney & Green v. Williams. 52 Varney 
followed the traditional approach towards aesthetics by not allowing 
local municipalities to regulate private property purely for aesthetic 
purposes.53 
43. 436 u.s. 447 (1978). In Ohra/ik, the Supreme Court upheld a lawyer's suspen­
sion from practice for face-to-face solicitation of business and did not recognize his firsi 
amendment right. Id at 467-68. 
44. Id at 456. 
45. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 581. 
46. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). 
47. 453 U.S. at 505-07. 
48. Id at 509-12. 
49. Id at 507-08. 
50. See note 36 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., Varney & Green v. Wil­
liams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909). 
51. 26 Cal. 3d at 860-61, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516, 610 P.2d at 413. 
52. 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909). 
53. 155 Cal. at 320, 100 P. at 868. The Supreme Court of California in Mefromedia 
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Throughout the twentieth century, cities have sought to avoid 
characterizing restrictive billboard legislation as aesthetic regulation. 
Cities instead declared billboards to be public nuisances or charac­
terized ordinances regulating billboards as serving standard police 
power purposes.54 Most courts sustained billboard controls by 
resorting to legal fiction. Courts ruled that, while aesthetics alone 
could not support a billboard ordinance, aesthetic considerations 
might be a legitimate police power objective if the ordinance also 
served more traditional police power objectives.55 
The Supreme Court of California in Metromedia "abandoned 
the legal fiction of prior decisions"56 and held that aesthetic consid­
erations alone, such as improving the appearance of an urban envi­
ronment to benefit the general welfare, may justify a city's exercise 
of its police power. 57 The Supreme Court of the United States and 
the California lower court recognized that a municipality has an in­
terest in eliminating billboards designed to be viewed from the 
streets and highways if the billboards unreasonably interfere with 
the aesthetics of the city.58 In addition, the Supreme Court reaf­
held that the two purposes of the ordinance were within the city's legitimate interests and 
that the ordinance was a "proper application of municipal authority over zoning and 
land use for the purpose of promoting the public safety and welfare." 26 Cal. 3d at 858, 
164 Cal. Rptr. at 514, 610 P.2d at 411. The California Supreme Court rejected the appel­
lants' argument that the ordinance was facially invalid under the first amendment. 
54. Such police power purposes include preserving property values, protecting 
tourism, or promoting traffic safety. 
55. Aronovsky, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: Aesthetics, the First Amend­
ment, and the Realities ofBillboard Control, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 295, 296 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as Aronovsky). 
56. Aronovsky, supra note 55, at 296. 
57. 26 Cal. 3d at 859, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 515, 610 P.2d at 412. State courts only 
recently have upheld billboard prohibitions based solely upon aesthetic considerations. 
In Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263,225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), the New 
York Court of Appeals upheld, on aesthetic grounds alone, a municipal ordinance ban­
ning off-site billboards from a small residential community. The court stated, "realisti­
cally, the primary objective of any anti-billboard ordinance is an esthetic one ...." Id 
at 269,225 N.E.2d at 753, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 27. See also John Donnally & Sons v. Out­
door Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975). In John Donnally & Sons, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld enactments that prohibited off­
premise signs within Brookline, Massachusetts. The court held that a constitutional 
amendment relating to the billboards, MASS. CONST. amend. art. 50 (1918), would justify 
the prohibitions, as would the municipality'S inherent police power. The court held that 
aesthetics alone would justify a total prohibition of billboards under the police power. 
Id at 223-24, 339 N.E.2d at 720. 
58. 453 U.S. at 510-11. Noting that "[b)illboards are intended to, and undoubtedly 
do, divert a driver's attention from the roadway," 26 Cal. 3d at 859,164 Cal. Rptr. at 515, 
610 P.2d at 412, the Supreme Court of California agreed with other courts that a legisla­
tive judgment declaring that billboards are traffic hazards is not unreasonable. See New­
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firmed its determination that aesthetic considerations, coupled with 
those of traffic safety, create a legitimate reason for permitting on­
site commercial billboards while banning them off-site. 59 
C. Commercial Speech and its First Amendment Protections 
Courts have generally treated billboards as commercial speech 
by focusing on the medium of expression rather than on the content 
of the message.60 Using these means, municipalities have tradition­
ally used their zoning powers to regulate the commercial speech ele­
ment of billboards.61 Commercial speech, defined as speech of any 
form that advertises a product or service for profit or for business 
purposes,62 has recently been vested with more first amendment pro­
tection than ever before.63 Today, the fact that an advertiser seeks a 
profit cannot justify stripping his communication of all first amend­
ment protection.64 
In Valentine v. Chrestensen,65 the Supreme Court concluded that 
the entrepreneur in New York City, by distributing his leaflet, was 
attempting to "pursue a gainful occupation in the streets. . ."66 and 
his right to do so was purely a matter for "legislative judgment."67 
The Court inferred that New York City's code,68 prohibiting the dis­
tribution of advertising matter in the streets,69 did not have to be 
justified by an overriding or compelling state interest,1o nor did it 
have to be judged against any inherent right to employ advertising as 
man Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978); State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 
593 P.2d 811 (1979). 
59. 453 U.S. at 510-12. 
60. Aronovsky, supra note 55, at 315. 
61. Id Zoning powers are derived from the police power of the states. Besides 
regulation of billboards, zoning powers have been used to confront many local problems: 
The prevention of hazardous conditions, Railway Express Agency v. City of New York, 
336 U.S. 106 (1949); the control of obscenity, Note, Colorado Municipal Government Au­
thority To Regulate Obscene Materials, 51 DEN. L.J. 75 (1974); and the protection of the 
aesthetic environment of the community, State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 
429 P.2d 825 (1967). 
62. J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 767. 
63. See note 73 infra and accompanying text; see also Linmark Associates, Inc. v. 
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 
(1975). 
64. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 652. 
65. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
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a business technique.71 The Court reasoned that if speech were 
purely commercial, it would be subject to regulation to the same ex­
tent and for the same reasons as other forms of commercial activ­
ity.72 Commentators have argued that the Chrestensen Court did not 
view commercial speech as worthy of first amendment protection.73 
The Court in Breard v. Alexandria74 subsequently extended 
Chrestensen and held that door-to-door salesmen could not claim 
the protection of the first amendment. Chrestensen and Breard were 
later interpreted to deny first amendment protection to all commer­
cial speech.75 
Notwithstanding Chrestensen, decided in 1942, and the tradi­
tional exclusion of commercial speech from first amendment protec­
tions, recent Supreme Court decisions have begun to afford 
commercial speech some protection under the first amendment. 76 
The extension of first amendment protections to purely commercial 
speech is a development in first amendment jurisprudence which be­
gan in three 1970's cases. 
In Bigelow v. Virginia,77 the managing editor of a weekly news­
paper in Virginia accepted an advertisement from a New York or­
ganization that provided abortion counseling and made referrals to 
New York hospitals and clinics that performed abortions. The edi­
tor subsequently was convicted of violating a Virginia statute78 mak­
71. ld 
72. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 769; see also Aronovsky, supra note 
55, at 318-19. 
73. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the 
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971). The Court in 
Chrestensen never defined commercial speech. Instead Chrestensen appeared to focus on 
commercial motivation as the critical factor in defining commercial speech. 316 U.S. at 
55. Later cases, however, made it clear that speech otherwise protected was not to be 
denied protection on the basis of the speaker's commercial motivation. New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (paid political advertising); Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, III (1943) (advertising the sale of literature by Jehovah's 
Witnesses). 
74. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
75. Redish, supra note 73, at 458. Contra, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 
495 (1952), where the Supreme Court rejected the argument that motion pictures are 
unprotected because they are made and exhibited for profit. The Court indicated that 
books, newspapers and magazines are published and sold for profit, but that fact does not 
prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the first 
amendment. ld at 501-02. 
76. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Vir­
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
77. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
78. ld 
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ing it a misdemeanor to encourage or to promote abortions in print 
media.79 The Court, for the first time, expressed its dissatisfaction 
with the prevalent approach of resolving a class of first amendment 
claims simply categorizing the speech as commercial. 80 The Court 
found that the advertisement conveyed newsworthy information to a 
wide variety of readers.81 The Supreme Court stated that the Vir­
ginia court erred in assuming that advertising, as such, is not entitled 
to first amendment protection.82 The Court added that speech is not 
stripped of first amendment protection merely because it appears in 
the form of a paid commercial advertisement. 83 Thus, according to 
Bigelow, the fact that the abortion advertisement had commercial 
aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial interests does not ne­
gate all first amendment guarantees. 
One year later, in Virginia State Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc .,84 the Court gave first amendment 
protection to advertisers seeking to disseminate price information for 
prescription drugs.85 The Court acknowledged that an advertise­
ment communicating prescription drug prices constitutes speech that 
transmits information to consumers.86 In holding the Virginia stat­
ute invalid,87 the Court said that commercial speech is not wholly 
outside the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Ad­
vertising is intended to increase the number of sales of a particular 
item or service, but that does not mean that this form of speech loses 
all its first amendment protection.88 The Court concluded, however, 
that although commercial speech merits protection, some forms of 
79. Id at 813. 
80. Id at 826. 
81. Id at 822. 
82. Id 
83. Id at 818; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) 
(stating that expression does not lose constitutional protection because it appears in the 
form of a paid advertisement). 
84. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
85. Id at 770. Appellees, as consumers of prescription drugs, brought suit against 
the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and its individual members, challenging the valid­
ity under the first amendment, of a Virginia statute declaring it unprofessional conduct 
for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs. Id at 748. 
86. Id at 765. Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (Supreme 
Court acknowledged a first amendment right to receive information and ideas, and de­
clared that freedom of speech necessarily protects the right to receive information). 
87. 425 U.S. at 770. 
88. Id. at 761; see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 580 (1973). The Court in 
Bales held that a total ban on price advertising by private attorneys, as enforced by an 
integrated state bar and the state's highest court, violates the first and fourteenth amend­
ments. Id at 384. 
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regulation are permissible.89 Thus Virginia Pharmacy, while recog­
nizing that commercial speech is entitled to first amendment protec­
tions, also recognized that such speech can be regulated in certain 
situations.9O 
The third case which recognized first amendment protection for 
commercial speech is Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Wil­
lingboro .91 A township ordinance prohibiting the posting of real es­
tate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, designed to prevent ''white flight" 
from a racially integrated community, was held to violate the first 
amendment.92 The Court stated that the constitutional defect in the 
Willingboro ordinance, was that it "acted to prevent its residents 
from obtaining certain information."93 The Court concluded that 
Willingboro's concern was not with the commercial aspect of "For 
Sale" signs, but with the substance of the information communicated 
to the citizens of the town.94 
The Digelow line of cases gave commercial speech first amend­
ment protection when such speech furnished the populace with 
truthful information. That the advertisement was intended to bring 
in money for the advertiser was no longer controlling9S because com­
mercial speech, in the form of advertisements, was given protection 
in order to inform the public of available goods and services.96 
89. 425 u.s. at 770-72. Permissible regulations of commercial speech would in­
clude a time, place and manner restriction, provided that they are justified without refer­
ence to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental 
interest and that in so doing, they leave open ample alternative channels for communica­
tion of the information. Id. at 771; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
116 (1972); U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
90. 425 U.S. at 770. 
91. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
92. Id. at 97. The Court in Linmarlc used a three part test for determining the 
validity of a restriction on commercial speech: (1) the restriction on speech must not 
relate to the content of the regulated expression; (2) the ordinance must serve a compel­
ling state interest unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) the legislation must 
leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Id. at 93-97. 
93. Id. at 96. The Court reasoned "that information which pertains to sales activ­
ity in Willingboro, is ofvital interest to Willingboro residents, since it may bear on one of 
the most important decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise their 
families." Id. 
94. Id. 
95. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 809. "[S)peech is not stripped of first amendment 
protection merely because it appears in the form of a paid advertisement." Id. at 818. 
96. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748; see also Linmark, 431 
U.S. at 85. 
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IV. THE VALIDITY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH REGULATION 
The protection afforded commercial speech continued in Central 
Hudson Gas v. Public Service97 in which a four part test was used to 
measure the validity of commercial speech regulation. In Me­
tromedia the Supreme Court used the Central Hudson Gas test to 
determine the validity of a governmental restriction98 on commercial 
speech. In Central Hudson Gas, the Supreme Court held invalid a 
regulation by the New York Public Service Commission which pro­
hibited a utility company from advertising to promote the use of 
electricity.99 The Court reasoned that although the Constitution ac­
cords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitu­
tionally guaranteed expression, the first amendment protects 
commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. 100 
The Court then created a four part test to determine when a govern­
mental restriction on commercial speech would be valid: 
1). The first amendment protects commercial speech only if that 
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; 
2) A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is 
valid only if it seeks to implement a substantial governmental 
interest; 
3) The restriction must directly advance that interest; and 
4) The restriction must reach no farther than necessary to ac­
complish the given objective. 101 
In applying this test, the Court in Metromedia concluded that 
the San Diego billboard ordinance, as applied to commercial speech 
was constitutiona1. 102 The Court stated that the ordinance clearly 
conformed to the first, second, and fourth criteria. 103 
The Court gave more setious attention to the third element of 
the test which deals with whether an ordinance directly advances the 
substantial governmental interest in traffic safety and aesthetics. The 
Court concluded that since "billboards are intended to, and un­
97. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
98. In Metromedia, the governmental restriction was the billboard ordinance. See 
note 7 supra. 
99. 447 U.S. at 569-71. 
100. Id. at 561. 
101. Id. at 563-66. 
102. 453 U.S. at 512. This test applies only to commercial speech because commer­
cial speech is not given all first amendment protection; therefore, commercial speech 
must be balanced against other interests. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. . 
103. 453 U.S. at 507. 
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dou~tedly do, divert a driver's attention from the roadway," 104 other 
courts are correct in agreeing with a legislative judgment that bill­
boards are traffic hazards. 105 With respect to the advancement of the 
aesthetic interests, the Supreme Court concluded that the large bill­
boards easily can be perceived as "esthetic harms," 106 and that San 
Diego could rightfully choose to minimize these structures as did 
other municipalities and states. 107 
Using the Central Hudson Gas test for its criteria, the Court con­
cluded that insofar as it regulated commercial speech, the San Diego 
ordinance complied with the four requirements of the test. IOS The 
Court agreed with the Supreme Court of California that the ordi­
nance could validly permit on-site commercial advertising while 
prohibiting it off-site under the requirements of the Central Hudson 
Gas test. 109 Thus, in concluding that the test of Central Hudson Gas 
allows a ban on billboards carrying commercial speech, the Court 
left open the question of whether the ordinance could have prohib­
ited all commercial billboards whether on-site or off-site. 
If the Court were concerned only with the aesthetics and traffic 
safety in the city, it could have banned all billboards, regardless of 
on-site or off-site status, while still conforming to the Central Hudson 
Gas test. Instead the Court balanced the governmental regulations 
against the individual's right to advertise his goods or services on his 
own property.IIO 
104. ld at 508. 
105. /d. see, e.g., E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 
F.2d 1141, 1152 (5th Cir. 1970); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 757 
(N.D. 1978). 
106. 453 U.S. at 510. San Diego is one of a growing number of cities that has 
enacted ordinances to minimize the number of billboards in a city. 
The federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028, 
23 U.S.c. § 131, requires that states eliminate billboards from areas adjacent to 
certain highways constructed with federal funds. The Federal Government, 
also prohibits billboards on federal lands. 43 C.F.R. 292\.0-6(a). Three states 
have enacted state-wide bans on billboards. Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 
23, § 190I el seq. (1980); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 264-71 el seq. ; § 445-111 el 
seq. (1976); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 10, § 488 et seq. (1973). 
ld at 510 n.16. 
107. ld at 510. 
108. ld at 503-12. 
109. ld at 512. 
110. ld The appellants, billboard advertisers, questioned whether the distinction 
between on-site and off-site advertising is justified in terms of aesthetics or traffic safety. 
ld at 511. The Court answered that the ordinance permits the occupant of the property 
to use billboards located on that property to advertise goods and services offered at that 
location while prohibiting all other advertisers from using those same billboards to pro­
mote their goods and services. ld at 512. 
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The Metromedia Court, while invalidating the entire ordinance 
on other grounds, III concluded that the San Diego ordinance, inso­
far as it regulated commercial speech, would have been valid within 
the state's police power because it related directly to the stated objec­
tives of traffic safety and aesthetics. 112 The Court also stated that 
San Diego might legitimately believe that off-site advertising 
"presents a more acute problem than does on-site advertising."113 
Through the enactment of such an ordinance, the city demonstrated 
its belief that the first amendment right to use on-site advertising is 
stronger than the city's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics. The 
Supreme Court's decision did not reject the city's judgment. Instead, 
the Court concluded that the owner of a business has a stronger in­
terest in identifying his place of business on those premises than he 
does in leasing its available space to another person who wants to 
advertise a business enterprise located elsewhere. I 14 
V. NONCOMMERCIAL BILLBOARD SPEECH AND 

THE FIRST AMENDMENT 

Although aesthetics and the preservation of property value may 
be deemed legitimate state interests properly furthered through po­
lice power regulation,115 no municipal ordinance can oppressively 
infringe on fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. I 16 Le­
gitimate state interests must be weighed against fundamental indi­
vidual interests. 117 Noncommercial speech is one of the fundamental 
rights expressly stated in the Constitution. 118 
The standard of review used by the Supreme Court for noncom-
Ill. The ordinance was invalidated because the Court believed that it unreasona­
bly infringed on an individual's right to free speech by interfering with the use of non­
commercial billboards. Id at 513. 
112. Id at 512. The Supreme Court stated that this is not altered by the fact that 
the ordinance is underinciusive because it permits on-site advertising. Id at 511. 
113. Id at 511. 
114. Id at 511-12. 

liS. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 

116. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (invalidating a 
city ordinance restricting extended families from living in the same home); Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I, 7 (1974) (ordinance restricting occupation of dwelling 
violated no fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution); Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (judicial deference to zoning legislation will end if the legislation in­
fringes on constitutionally protected rights). 
117. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (first amendment interests 
must be weighed against the importance of countervailing state interests). 
118. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free­
dom of speech...." Id 
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mercial speech cases is strict scrutiny. This standard requires that a 
state interest be sufficiently compelling,119 furthered by the least in­
trusive means possible,120 with the means bearing a substantial rela­
tion to the compelling governmental interest. 121 Governmental 
restriction of noncommercial speech must be nondiscriminatory and 
justified by a state interest which is unrelated to the suppression of 
expression. 122 In commercial speech cases the Supreme Court ap­
plies a balancing test. 123 In noncommercial speech issues the Court 
places a heavy burden on the state to justify the infringement, and 
requires a sufficiently compelling state interest. The Court, under 
these standards of review, believed that because the San Diego ordi­
nance prohibited noncommercial billboard advertising, the ordi­
nance had to fall. The ordinance failed because it reached too far 
into the area of protected speech. 124 
In early cases, the Court sustained regulation of billboards, and 
claimed that regulation did not violate first amendment require­
ments.125 The Court rejected these constitutional challenges, 126 
holding that the regulation of billboards fell within the legitimate 
police power of local governments. 127 
Since those decisions, the Court has not given plenary consider­
ation to cases involving first amendment challenges to statutes or or­
dinances limiting the use of billboards, preferring on several 
occasions to summarily affirm decisions sustaining state or local leg­
islation directed at billboards. 128 
In Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 129 the Supreme 
Court summarily affirmed a judgment sustaining an ordinance 
which distinguished between off-site and on-site billboard advertis­
ing, prohibiting the former l3o and permitting the latter. l3l The 
Court rejected the claim that the ban on off-site billboard advertising 
violated the first amendment. For purposes of first amendment anal­
119. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977). 
120. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 581. 
121. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 64 (1976). 
122. 453 U.S. at 514-15. 
123. Id at 520-21. 
124. Id at 521. 
125. 453 U.S. at 498. 
126. Id at 498 n.7. 
127. Id 
128. Id See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
129. 439 U.S. 808 (1978). 
130. Id 
131. Id 
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ysis in Sujfolk, a billboard subject to the limiting ordinance was de­
fined as one involving purely commercial messages. 132 The Sujfolk 
definition of billboard, however, differed greatly from that in Me­
tromedia,133 because the ordinance in Sujfolk did not include the 
broad range of noncommercial speech prohibited by the San Diego 
ordinance. 134 Thus, because the San Diego ordinance was chal­
lenged on the ground that it prohibited noncommercial speech, Suf­
folk was not controlling. 13S 
In Lotze v. Washington, 136 on the other hand, the appellants er­
ected, on their property, a billboard expressing their own political 
and ideological views. 13? The ordinance allowed on-site commercial 
advertising but banned all other speech and as such, the state or­
dered the appellants to remove their billboards. 138 The Supreme 
Court summarily affirmed the judgment and rejected the first 
amendment challenge to the ordinance. 139 
In Metromedia, the Supreme Court took a different stand on 
noncommercial speech and billboards. The Court recognized that a 
first amendment challenge to the ordinance created a legitimate is­
sue. l40 Noncommercial speech did not lose its first amendment pro­
tection merely because of the means used to communicate the 
speech. 141 The fact that speech was communicated through bill­
boards, instead of through television, radio, or magazines, did not 
make it any less worthy of protection under the first amendment. 142 
VI. IMPLICATION OF METROMEDIA 
The Supreme Court has defined the limits of billboard regula­
tion by local governments through its decision in Metromedia. Local 
governments may regulate commercial billboards located on private 
property in the name of traffic safety and aesthetics, although defini­
132. Id 
133. 453 u.s. at 499. 
134. Id 
135. Id 
136. 444 U.S. 921 (1979). 
137. Id at 923. 
138. Id 
139. Id at 921. 
140. 453 U.S. at 513. 
141. Id 
142. Id at 513-14. "Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose 
to limit their content to commercial messages; the city may not conclude that the commu­
nication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected with a par­
ticular site is of greater value than the communication of noncommercial messages." Id 
at 513. 
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tion of the relationship between the competing interests can be diffi­
cult. The state has interests which extend to promoting municipal 
beautification while there simultaneously exists the danger of gov­
ernmental intrusion upon individual property rights. The Court in 
Metromedia held that on-site commercial advertising should not be 
banned because the owner of property has an interest in advertising 
his products and services. This same interest, however, does not ex­
tend to those who want to advertise their goods and services on prop­
erty which does not belong to them. Aesthetics and traffic safety 
outweigh the interests of off-site advertisers. 
Metromedia is consistent with other decisions upholding bill­
board ordinances banning off-site commercial advertising. Me­
tromedia, however, differs from other billboard cases because it does 
not limit its analysis to commercial speech. Instead, the Court recog­
nized that noncommercial speech must be protected by the first 
amendment regardless of the medium of communication. 
The Court held that noncommercial messages conveyed on bill­
boards are to be afforded full first amendment protection. Police 
power objectives of aesthetics and traffic safety are not compelling 
state interests and, therefore, do not outweigh an individual's right to 
free speech even if the speech is communicated through rented bill­
board space. 
Metromedia divided the Court.143 The plurality opinion, writ­
ten by Justice White, was joined only by Justice Marshall, Justice 
Stewart, and Justice Powell. The other Justices filed separate opin­
ions, either concurring in part or dissenting. 144 The controversy sur­
rounding M etromedia indicated that it is not the last word on the 
issue of the regulation of billboards. One question yet to be an­
swered is whether a city can totally ban commercial billboards as 
well as noncommercial billboards if the city can show that a substan­
tial governmental interest is directly furthered by such a ban. An­
other unresolved issue is whether city officials have the discretion to 
determine whether a proposed message is commercial or noncom­
mercial. Finally, if aesthetics are a substantial reason for banning 
off-site commercial billboards, it is unresolved whether aesthetics 
143. The decision had five separate opinions, with the holding commanding a plu­
rality of the Court. Justice Rehnquist described the Court's decision as a "virtual Tower 
of Babel." Id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
144. Justice Brennan filed an opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined, concur­
ring in the judgment. Id. at 521. Justice Stevens dissented in part and filed an opinion. 
Id. at 540. Chief Justice Burger dissented and filed an opinion. Justice Rehnquist dis­
sented and filed an opinion. Id. at 555. 
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alone could be sufficiently substantial to ban on-site commercial 
billboards. 
In a concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Blackmun 
viewed the San Diego ordinance as a total ban on the use of bill­
boards to communicate commercial or noncommercial messages and 
reasoned that the city did not show that substantial governmental 
interests would be served by its ban on an entire medium of commu­
nication. 14s The Justices found the ordinance to be invalid because 
there existed no evidence that the ban would improve traffic safety, 
the ordinance was not drafted narrowly enough to accomplish the 
traffic safety goal, nor was the ban a serious effort to make beautiful 
the commercial and industrial area of San Diego. l46 
Justice Stevens concurred in the plurality's statement that com­
mercial billboards could be banned, but he dissented from its hold­
ing that noncommercial messages could not be prohibited. 147 He 
stated that the plurality addressed the issue of a property owner's 
right to exhibit noncommercial messages although the appellants 
. had not raised the issue. 148 He stated, therefore, that this premise 
which led to the plurality's holding was merely a hypothetical issue, 
and not one asserted by the parties. 
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, reasoned that although the first 
amendment protects an individual's right to free speech, it does not 
mandate a similar right for an individual to communicate by the me­
dium of his choice. 149 He further argued that as long as the city does 
not prevent the discussion of ideas, ISO or permit authorities to favor 
some speakers and not others,lsl the city may require speakers to use 
other, less intrusive mediums of communication. 
The Chief Justice also differed with the plurality's holding that 
the San Diego ordinance was invalid because it showed a higher re­
gard for commercial speech than for noncommercial speech. 152 He 
argued that the plurality denied "to every community the important 
145. Id at 527-28. 
146. Id at 528-34. The aesthetics argument is weak because in San Diego, bill­
boards were only allowed in areas already zoned for industrial and commercial develop­
ment. Id at 531-32. The aesthetics argument perhaps would have been more effective if 
the city was trying to preserve areas that were pleasant to look at, as opposed to areas 
where little, except commercial and industrial buildings, existed. 
147. Id at 540-42 (Stevens, ]., dissenting). 
148. Id at 544-45. 
149. Id at 557-58 (Burger, C.]., dissenting). 
150. Id at 561-62. 
151. Id 
152. Id at 557-58. 
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powers reserved to the people and the States by the Constitution," 
and that each locality must be allowed to decide for itself the proper 
limits to be placed upon speech. 153 
The plurality of the Court invalidated the San Diego ordinance 
and stated that the city impermissibly preferred commercial speech 
over noncommercial speech. 154 The categories of commercial and 
noncommercial speech, however, cannot always be separated clearly 
and distinguished, especially in the instance where commercial ad­
vertisers phrase their messages in ideological terms so as to obscure 
the dividing line. Advertisers of any service or product may com­
pare the price, efficiency, safety and performance of their goods to 
those of competitors and call the message a consumer service. It is 
thus often difficult to separate the two classes of speech when the 
message being conveyed has characteristics of both. Local authori­
ties may not want the burden of determining which messages are 
commercial and which are noncommercial because such efforts 
could be held to constitute a form of censorship. 155 The plurality of 
Justices held the San Diego ordinance unconstitutional because it 
prohibited individuals from displaying noncommercial ideas and 
viewpoints on billboards which were rented to convey the 
messages. 156 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Melromedia attempted to resolve the 
conflict between the San Diego municipal billboard ordinance and 
the first amendment right to free speech. Managing only a plurality 
decision, the Court concluded that a municipality can permit bill­
boards with commercial messages to be displayed on-site while 
prohibiting them off-site. The Court also concluded that billboards 
carrying noncommercial speech could not be banned on-site or off­
site because a total ban violated the first amendment. Melromedia 
reaffirmed that commercial speech is accorded some first amendment 
protection, but it can be regulated under the state's police power for 
the good of traffic safety and aesthetics. 
The Court declared the San Diego ordinance invalid not be­
cause of its ban on off-site commercial speech, but because it imper­
153. ld at 567-69. "The fatal flaw in the plurality's logic comes when they con­
clude that San Diego by exempting on-site commercial signs, thereby has 'afford[ed] a 
greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech.''' ld at 567. 
154. ld at 513-14. 
155. ld at 537-40 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
156. ld at 521. 
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missibly restricted noncommercial speech. The Court mandated 
specifically that noncommercial speech on billboards is to be ac­
corded full first amendment protection unless a compelling state in­
terest in their prohibition is demonstrated. The city of San Diego 
failed to establish a compelling interest, therefore, the ordinance was 
held to be invalid on its face. The holding, however, was supported 
by only a plurality of the Justices, and the dissenting views indicate 
thatMetromedia is not the Court's final pronouncement on the ques­
tion of billboard regulation. 
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